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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
William Torrey Harris in Retrospect 
:[ 
The influence of William Torrey Harris upon edu-
a~tion in the nineteenth and twentieth·centuries was indeed s~gnificant. A few tributes from two of his many cornmenta- · 
t~~rs will illUstrate this point. Neil McCluskey writes, 
II 
As United States Cornmissiore:edf'Education he was the 
most eminent philosophical, professional educational 
official of the world.. No other American public 
school official except Horace Mann has commanded 
respect in official circles throughout the world as 
did he. No other Ame~ican has received anything 
approaching the almost idolatrous worship of 
America•s public school men which he received during 
the years in which he was the official professional 
leader of the school people of the United States.1 
JYerle Curti states, 11While it was Mann who laid tl).e foun-
dation of the American public school system, it was w. T. 
Earris who presided over the rearing of the structure.n2 
If these opinions are accurate, then any additional 
~nowledge of how William Torrey Harris came to formulate his 
];osition will not only give us a better understanding of 
1McCluskey, PSME, 100. 
2 Curti, SIAE, 310. 
1 
I 
I 
I 
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II 
~arris~ but also a deeper understanding of American Edu-
11 
cation as it is today. 
Evidence of the Influence of Hegel 
'I Perhaps the title of this work, The Influence of 
:; 
:peorg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel on William Torrey Harris, 
,, 
fo;ould seem presumptuous; perhaps the title should have been 
~n the interrogative sense rather,than the declarative sense. 
~ut there is a great deal of evidence to support a declara-
tive title. In one of Harris' articles he clearly points to 
!the Hegelian influence. Harris stated, "I not only thought 
Fegel, but lived Hegel, was Hegel. All that I have ever· 
~nown or done I Hegelized with a sort of desperation."3 
i Harris' first contact with the writings of Hegel 
came as a result of his association with Henry C. Brocloneyer, 
whom he met at a meeting of the st. Louis Literary and 
Philosophical Society. Brockmeyer not only suggested that 
Harris acquaint himself with the works of Hegel, but also 
lorfered to translate Hegel's Logic into English. After this 
first meeting with Brockmeyer, Harris made a notation in his 
!!diary. He stated, "He informed me that Hegel was the great 
man among modern philosophers and that his Logic was the 
work to get. 114 After reading the Logic, Harris stated, 
''The mental atmosphere of the book has a quelling and 
3snider, SLM, 119. 
4Muirhead, Art., 11HHCA, 11 237. 
2 
I • 
spothing effect on the student. All the collisions and 
II p~tty details of terrestrial affairs seem to fall away, and 
a1r>e mere gazes, as it were,·· into their eternal archetypes, 
apd sees the essence of the conflict, the pr9blem reduced to 
its lowest terms. 115 It seemed that Harris had a great deal 
li 
o!f difficulty with Hegel: "I began to study Hegel about 
1~59. My progress in understanding Hegel, and indeed all the 
6 . 
g'~"'ea t philosophers has been:: indeed slow. H The influence of 
Eegel seemed to be of such a magnitude that when Harris 
. :t:iublished his Introduction to Philosophy it J1followed Hegel 
so closely as to be virtually a paraphrase.H7 
But, why such a great interest and attraction to 
:Eegel? One possible explanation is that the conflict in 
II 
rerica, which saw a concrete mani~~station in the Ci~il War, 
s/remed to center around the question of the relationship of 
ihe state to the individual. Thus, there_ seemed to be a 
reed for a philosophical point of view that would justify 
·' 
the state, and at the same ti:me·would place a high value on 
Jhe worth of the individual. Transcendentalism seemed to ~ktisf"y the need f"or the latter, but did not account f"or the 
jupremacy of the state. Hegelianism, from Harris' interpre-
la tion, seemed to meet both these demands. "They [The st. 
I 5Harris A t 11BTHHM, u 148. , r ., 
6Ibid. 
7schaub, (ed), WTH, 77· 
3 
I 
i I 
I 
Iff 
.Jouis Hegelians ] found in the German romantic philosophy a 
~eady-made formula by which they could interpret the life of 
he frontier and the tragic confli.ct of the Civil war. 118 
H At this point, one may get the impression that Harris 
~erely took what Hegel had said- and applied it to the 
~merican scene. This is not quite' true and at best ~ould be ~' . . ain oversimplification. This work will attempt to point out 
Jn what sense Hegel influenced Harris-with special attention 
Jiven to the educational influence. 
Format for the Thesis 
The approach to this problem will be to give first a 
I' 
Eummary of Hegel 1s life, giving special attention to those 
Events that may·.·Jlelp in understand'ing the man as well as . 
Ehedding some l±ght"'on his philosophical position and his 
concern for education. The next step will be to make an 
c:ttempt to summarize Hegel's philosophical position as it 
I~rtains to education. The educational point of view of 
II 
J::::l::::•a:d:::::::1:r:::::;o::;:fH::::a:::~ "His 
J~eas on education were expressed in his works on philosophy 
1pd his addresses to students and, as rector to the public.
119 
II 
his work will take advantage of the works of Hegel that 
8 Ibid., 71. 
9Eby, DME, 428. 
4 
• 
·• 
'! ' ' 
~ave particular relevance to education as well as to his 
lany addresses to the public in the area of education. 
Chapter III will include a si~lar format for the 
~osition of William Torrey Harris, that is, a brief outline 
pf his life, paying particular attention to those factors q 
~hat seemed to have influenced Harris. It will also include 
iftn outline of his general philosophical position and its 
relevance to his philosophy of education. 
1/ 
· The final chapter will state the conclusions that. can 
be made as a result of this study. 
5 
' 
i 
;e. 
i 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
!I 
II 
,, 
CHAPrER II 
HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHICAL AND EDUCATIONAL POSITION 
Education and Early Influence 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was born at Stillgart 
i~ Wurtemburg on August 27, 1770. His father was a secre-
t~ry at the local revenue office, whose salary put the ~ . 
Eegels in the middle class, economically. Hegel remembered 
bis father mostly for his insistence upon order and detail j l hich no doubt had an influence on Hegel. His mother seemed 
J6 be a women of taste and refinement and was Hegel's first 
I. 
'tieacher. The Hegels-·belonged to the Church of Prussia, i
1
hlch at that time seemed to pride "itself' with its emphasis 
c~n rationalism. 
/j Hegel's first school teacher was a man named Loffer 1 
ij ' 
:tho took an immediate interest in the young · Hege 1, When 
Joffer died, Hegel wrote in his diary, 
II His chief care was to be of use to his pupils and 
to the world. He knew the value of knowledge and 
the consolation it insures in the midst of life's 
uncertainties. How often and how contentedly did 
he sit by me and I by him in that beloved little 
room. Few knew his true worth. Now he has 
fallen asleep, but ever shall 'I bear his memory 
in my heart.1 
lMackenzie, HE 1 7. 
6 
!I 
When Hegel entered the Gymnasium, he concentrated 
on literature. It is also interesting to note'that ~~stly e was critical about some of the methods employed in eaching, and especially those used in the teaching of Latin. ~~gel claimed that too mu~h attention was given to the 
hntent and not enough to the thought. At the end of his 
c1burse work at the Gymnasium Hegel delivered a valedictory 
t'~fore his classmates and faculty •. He stated, 
II 
li 
II 
Such a mighty influence has education upon the entire 
well-being of the state. How strikingly is its 
neglect· seen in the Turkish nation. If we regard 
the natural capabilities of the Turk, and then see 
how barbarous he is because unschooled, and how 
little he advances knowledge, we can then rightly 
value our own good fortune. 2 
fjere Hegel seems to be talking more like ·a teacher than a 
fung man f'reed f'rom school t.isks. Upon graduation from the 
:.econdary school, he entered the University of Jena where he 
' . 
~ tudied philosophy and theology. While at these studies, he 
j :ound Kant and Rousseau of particular interest. Also during 
,, . . 
~is university~~: studies,· he had an opportunity to meet 
Jlriedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling,; in fact, they both 
~elonged to the same political club. 
Teaching Experience 
Upon graduation, Hegel to_ok a teaching position as a 
'utor, not because he enjoyed tutoring but because the job 
gave him a great amount of free time to think and to write. 
2 Luqueer, HAE, 13. 
7 
Eb only stayed a short time as a tutor at Bern when he 
alcepted a similar position at Frarikfort. While at Frankfort, 
ij ' 
b!i.s father died and left Hegel enough money so that he could 
t~ke a year off from tutoring in order to think and to write. 
~· ' 
A~ter this Hegel accepted a position as lecturer at the 
'U~iversi ty of Jena where he stayed for seven year~. He left 
I 1pis position to assume a position as editor of a newspaper, 
c job he held for one year before accepting a position of 
Fkctor of the Gymnasium at Nurmburg. While in this position, 
re taught philosophy,. morals, and religion. HiS method in 
the classroom was to first ask the boys to summarize the 
Irevious class. From here Hegel wquld begin his lesson for 
I ~ne day. 1~e was glad to be interrupted in what he was i ' 
l:ljying, but laziness and inattent~~n he could not tolerate •113 
1l is interesting to note that Hegel felt it his duty to 
] efrain from expressing any political preference in the 
< llassroom. JJKeenly interested in the political questions of 
lte day, he thought it his duty, a~ Rector of the Gymnasium, 
mo abastain not only from all active participation in 1~oli tical work, but from definite expression of opinion. 114 
Shortly before resigning this position, he met and 
I~rried Marie Von Tucker, a girl more than twenty years 
3Mackenzie, HE, 33. 
4• Ibid., 37. 
8 
;younger than he • After his marriage, he left this position 
to accept a post at the University .of Heidelburg;, where he-
1 ectured and wrote the Encylopaedia of Philosophy. After its .. 
completion, he accepted a position at the University of 
Ierlin where he lectured until his death in 1831. 
Before an investigation of the educational views of 
Eegel, it is necessary to stress the fact that Hegel never 
Jrote any systematic philosophy of education. It can be 
further suggested that Hegel's educational ideas are a part 
cf his general philosophical position. Thus, in order to 
get an understanding of his educational theory, one cannot 
jsolate his views on education from his philosophical 
·q~sition. 
The Dialectic 
The Hegelian system develops in triads; that is, the 
hesis and its opposite, the antithesis, are unified in the 
:ynthesis, which in turn.forms a new thesis. ·For example, 
re system starts with being, in an abstract sense and not lr some concrete sense, in other wOrds just plain "isness." 
'.It has no content for content of any kind would be a 
f pecific determination. uS Thus we have being, which is 
common to all things, but we 
~w being unless we can see 
I, 5 Stace, HP, 90. 
cannot come to understand or 
it in relation to something that 
9 
-·-··· --· ---- ·-------------~~-- .. ------·--~------
1s other than being, which is not-being. In other words, 
ceing is emptiness, but such absence of any character is 
siimply nothing. That is, being and not-being coincide and 
c!he can pass into another.. nAnd the pure concept of being 
if 
~F thus seen to contain the idea of nothing. But to show 
1hat one category contains another is to deduce that other 
!I jrom it. Hence we have deduced the category nothing from 
he category being. 116 The idea of being and nothing (not 
J!eing) passing into each other gives rise to the third 
Joncept of becoming, since becoming is being as well as not-
Peing. 
il 
This triadic movement does not stop. "From the 
il 
~oint of view of analysis, dialectic is a method where each 
<f!oncept may ·be seen to imply its own opposite as a necessary 
and inseparable part of itself. 117 One can better understand 
II 
~his movement, if it is .seen in an actual situation. Hegel 
ii 
~ites, 
Each individual has a threefold li:fe of body, soul 
and spirit; perhaps it would be truer to say that 
this represents three distinct planes of existence 
which man must learn to live and control • The 
apparent order of development of the individual is 
upward from the body life, through to that of the 
animal soul [instinct, impulses, feeling, etc.]8 
6Ibid., 90-91. 
7r.oewenburg, HS, 27. 
8M3.ckenzie, HE, 60. 
10 
'i 
rrhus 3 since indiViduals develop in this manner, the society 
J~ust come to recognize this fact and set up laws and rules of 
onduct accordingly. 
,1· This leads us i1;1to Hegel's ethical theory and his 
ll~losophy of culture, which are central to his philosophy of 
Education. 
ll 
j Rights and Duties 
An individual, according to Hegel, whether he is a 
,l~tizen of a state or not, has the capacity for rights. The 
+ghts of persons Who have not become citizens of a state are 
c\'pstract rights. nThe sphere of abstract rights is the 
::/~here of those rights and duties which accrue to human 
II . 
r:~ings considered abstractly~ i.e., simply as persons, and 
rtbt yet citizens of states.u9 But, these rights do not 
J~nge on any mere· existence as a person, ·but only in 
connection with other persons. Hence the imperative of right 
js: 11Be a person and respect others as persons.!'10 One of 
these rights is the right to own property. If one desires 
1\ 
1o exchange his property for some other property, he has to 
come into contact with other persons, who perhaps will 
,, 
II 
k argain with him in order to reach some agreement and to 
arrive at an understanding. As Hegel states 3 they form a 
1 
'common will. !I uTheir implicit identity becomes realized 
9stace, HP, 382. 
10nyde, PR, 67. 
11 
i 
~hrough the transference of property by mutual consent, and 
~ith the preservation of their rights. This is contract. 1111 
'~'he so-called 11social contract 11 is not a contract since 
1)ersons, in a concrete situation, are members of a state. 
,'\he social contract s~ems superficial to Hegel, since both 
l,p.rties want to remain 11possessor. 11 
Also, in a contract, we have two wills, common and 
};·articular.. They differ in the sense that the common will 
js agreement while the particular wirl~is performance. In 
I sbme primitive tribes these two wills are identical. That 
!! 
'I i~ to say, the natives agree to sell some property to 
apother tribe, but they do not take the steps that are 
II 
'I n' cessary for a transaction. In fact, the natives just sit 
•' . 
aod wait for the other tribe to come to them. 
For Hegel, wrong occurs when one gives the impression 
t at he is in agreement, while in reality, he has no 
~f,tent~on of supporting his part of the bargain. In other 
w®rds, the common will or agreement will not become 
Ill 
aj:tualized. Right, however, occurs when the persons have 
f 11 intention of supporting what has been regarded as 
:1 ' 
c mmon will. 
Another type of wrong is unintentional wrong, which 
i~ nothing more than holding something that is wrong, but 
II 
12 
---
I/ 
trought as being right • It is important to note that there 
i$ no penalty attached to this type of wrong, since one has 
i' 
r.'Ot willed against right. 
Another type of wrong is open defiance of right or 
wtlat Hegel calls crime. 
I 
Hit negates not only the particular 
opject of my will, but also, the univers&l-or infinite, which 
is involved in the predicate 'mine-, 1 the very capacity for !! 
.ii 
ItPssessing rights; nor does it utilize my opinion, as in 
.f: ud ,,12 J•ra • 
I' 
'
1 Punishment, on the other hand, cannot be justified on 
:I 
;(tilitarian grounds, such as a deterrent to crime. Hegel 
frates, "Revenge is mine, says God in the Bible, and, when 
f
1
eme find in the word re-tribution the idea of a special 
!>leasure for the subjective will, it must be replied that it 
.ignifies only the turning back of crime against itself. ul3 
:~tace makes this point clearer, "Justice abolishes the crime 
• nd restores right. But revenge merely adds a second wrong I 14 jo the first • 11 Now punishment :f,'or a crime can be deter-~ined by the type of crime • That is, if a man insists on 
II . 
~sing violence on his fellow man, then the punishment shall 
Je the use of violence on the Violator. Hegel warns, 
II To adhere obstinately to the equalization of 
punishment and crime in every case would reduce 
retribution to an absurdity. It would be necessary 
12Ibid. 
l3Ibid., 100. 
14stace, HP, 330. 
13 
-. 
' 
II 
to institute a theft in return for a theft, 
robbery for robbery, and to demand an eye for 
an eye and a tooth for a tooth, although the 
criminal, as we can easly fancy_, might have 
one eye or be toothless.15 
M~der_, then is p~nishable by death, because one has used 
mlli'der as the law; then the use of the murderer.'s(:own law on 
II h~m, would be justice. 
I) If the crime goes beyond the expectation of the 
c~iminal, Hegel felt that the criminal was still responsible .. 
F~r example, if a fire does more damage than was originally 
II i~tended, the criminal is still responsible for all the 
d~mages that occur. Hegel writes, 11In acting I must expose 
myself to misfortune; ,that also has a right to me, and is the 
" t n16 rranifesta ion of my own will. On the other hand, children 
I 
a~ the mentally ill are not responsible for their actions 
II 
II 
since they have not willed against right. 
Ends and Means 
In the area of ends and means, Hegel felt that people 
tad no right to justify questionable means with some particu-
J ar good end. On the other hand, if a man was starving and 
cruld not purchase any food and had exhausted all other means 
to get food and failed, then by refusing to steal, he would 
re committing a wrong. 
15 Dyde, HPR, 99. 
16Ibid. , 116. 
--------- ----w---- ------ - -·- ------- -----· ------ --------u-.-
14 
e. 
What then is the good for Hegel? liThe good is the 
idea, or unity of the conception of the will with the 
II p~rticular will. This unity is Realized Freedom, the 
;. 17 . 
a[bsolute final cause of the world • 11 Stace writes, 11Hence 
wren I will reasonably my will coincides with the universal 
will; it coincides with its notion, and is, therefore, 
gbod. 1118 How this notion can be realized in a social scheme 
wl11 be given in the following sections: 
I 
II First, the ethical system for Hegel is 11 the idea of 
~eedom. It is the living good, which has in self-conscious-
r1kss its knowledge and willing, and through the action of 
s[blf-consciousness its activity. Self-consciousness, on the 
clfher band, finds in the ethical system its absolute basis 
and motive."19 The best possibility for the realization of 
the ethical is in the state. To understand how this is 
Jbssible, Hegel begins with the family • 
. , 
The Family 
In the.family, the individuals involved give up their 
~lbdividuality for the sake of the family. To insure the 
(uccess of the family, steps must be taken to provide for 
l7 Ibid • , 123 • 
18stace, HP, 401. 
19Dyde, HPR, 155. 
15 
-: .. ·~ . ' 
: 
' 
" 
i 
some of its needs. This is primarily the responsibility of 
il 
t~e rather, who provides the physical necessities such as 
f0od, shelter, and clothing. Also, the father has to see 
'I 
tpat the children will be sent to school and should make all 
1: !'le arrangements for payment. The father also represents 
i 
the family when it comes into contact with other families. 
The Civic Community 
I The disruption or' the family as a unit takes place 
·I 
II -i~Len the sons and daughters wish to exercise their right to 
'II,
1i:trry, and to form new families.. ''This process constitutes I 
!he disruption of the old family. 1120 The notion(()f the civil 
1 ~ ociety is a logical result of the disruption of the old I . . . 
lamily. While the family was based on feeling {love) the 
ivil society is based on 11intelligent self-seeking. Jl Hegel p ·. . 
1J.1aims that in the civil society, ·11each establishes and 
.Ja tisfies himself by the means of the other, and so must call 
ln the assistan-ce of the form of the universal. "21 One can 
~ain a clearer understanding of the civil community if one 
~ecalls what Hegel .had to ~<'Y about contract. That is the 
~ndividual, as he exists as I, comes into contact with some-
~me other than himself or a non-I. They in turn form a common 
20stace, HP, ~11. 
21Dyde, HPR, 186. 
I 
16 
; l 
\.._) 
w~ll, which is necessary for the successful contract. Or 
;. 
ihe thesis, I, comes into contact with the antithesis, the 
ron-I, and they form a common will; the synthesis. Now the 
1iviC community is a logical result of two or more independent 
~amilies in the same manner that the contract was the unity of 
tiwo independent wills. 
The three basic elements of the civic community are 
jhe system of wants, administration of justice, and the 
jolice. 
I The system of wants contains the individual's own 
self-interest. It is accomplished by the use of others as 
Instruments to their own private needs, but these individuals 
iho are used as means to other persons also use individuals s instruments f'or their ends. Hegel states, ui acquire from 
l:i 
~thers the means of satisfaction, and must according~y fall 
~n with their opinion. At the same time, I am compelled to 
produce the means for the satisfaction of the wants of 
lith Jl22 
, ers. 
The second element of civic society is the admin-
stration of justice. Thus since the individual has rights 
Jhere must be an instrument to make them realizable. ·stace 
~ . 
P,omments, 
II 
II I~ 
Hence what formerly existed as bare rights, existing 
in a subjective way only in a person, now proceeds 
22Dyde, H~R, 192. 
17 
II 
II 
forth into objectivity, becomes definitely established, 
instituted and recognized as having universal validity 
and authority in the social fabric.23 · 
I't is also important to note that laws are made to protect the 
r~ghts of individuals against those that would exploit other 
p~rsons• rights for their own advantage; that is, law can not 
i~rfunge on what a person desires to do with himself, so long 
II 
a~ his actionsdo not infringe on the rights of others. It 
m~st also be noted that laws do not remain stagnant, they 
m~st be continuously amended; that is, they must never be 
r~garded, as Hegel puts it, as •ten commandments.' 
I 
i~dividual against the inroads of the contingent, casual, and 
fllrtuitous is the function of the police.u24 The corporation 
F i~ also a part of this section. It is simply an institution 
t~ serve the interest of the people. It is established 
u~ually in the commercial class for such purposes as mainten-
afce, construction, health, and.collection of taxes. It is 
i portant to note that the corporation serves individual 
. g !:oups. nThough a corporation pursues, in the first instance, 
i~s own special interest, its activities nevertheless promote 
t1e universal ends of society, just as the self-seeking 
ajtivities of the indiVidual do so.1125 
23stace, HP, 418. 
24Ibid • , 421. 
25rbid e , 422 • 
18 
.... 
The State 
Row then does the civic society give rise to the 
i[ 
sipate, the synthesis of the family 'and civic society? Hegel 
w:l->ites, 
I The limited and finite end of the corporation has its 
I truth in the absolutely universal end and the absolute 
11 activity of this end. This actualized end is also the 
:' truth of the division involved in the external system 
II. of police, which is merely a relative identity of the , divided elements. Thus the sphere of civil society I passes inibo the state •26 
1~ other words, when the individuals' private ends are still 
il opposition to the ends of society, there is a gap between 
-.
1
[1 va te interest and public interest. This gap is to be 
rarrowed in the state. This is to say private interest will 
)~incide with public interest in the state. 
I Thus the state will reconcile the private with the 
~~· ' ' \ 
I':ublic, the particular with the universal. It is the idea 
< f the family projected to the entire society.. T:t:at is, the 
ftate is an attempt to unite individuals-in one family. The I . . .. . . .. 
rain difference between the state and the family is that the 
"rmily is only universal in the. realm of feeling. Thus the 
amily has the content of the universal (feeling), but lacks 
·he form (thought). The state which is a higher universal has 
oth content (feeling) and form (thought). Hegel felt that 
1the state is no alien authority which imposea itself upon 
26nyde, HPR, 256 • 
19 
; I 
e . t~e individual and suppresses his individuality. 1127 
Thus the necessity of the state brings about more 
' 
f•"'eedom for the individual. Marcuse states, 11At the same time 
II · · 
this necessity is freedom because the process is not deter-
n jJned from the outside, by external forces, but in a strict 
f: 113'nse, is a self-development; all conditions are grasped and 
/~osi ted 1 by the developing real self •1128 
!I 
. i! This brings the function of spirit or mind into 
regel's conception of the state. It is in the state that the 
~pirit or mind becomes objectified. Stace writes, 
The identity of universal and particular, of state 
claims and individual claims, is founded upon the 
fact that the individual is implicitly universal, 
and that the state, as the .actual universal, is but 
the objectification of the true self of the 
individual.29 
The state becomes for Hegel the most noble of all 
II ~uman institutions. He writes, 'We must honor the state as 
~he divine on earth, and must learn that if it is difficult to ~onceive of nature, it is infinitely harder to apprehend the 
lftate 1130 
1 . The state is also divided in:to three sections. 
I 
~irst is the constitution, which is subdivided into the 
27stace, HP, 425. 
2~rcuse, RR, 154 •. · 
29stace, HP, 429. 
30Dyde, HPR, 276. 
The 
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i! 
,I 
ir;'esponsibili ty of the Prince, the function of the executive, 
lnd the function of the legislative branch. ·T:ne second 
II 
section is called foreign polity~ by Hegel, which is nothing 
~ore than the foreign relation of the state. The third 
section is world history .which is the unfolding of the spirit. 
In history the .. ldea unfolds its various phases in 
time and the ·dominan~ phase at any epoch is embodied 
in a dominant people. The succession of these 
phases constitutes world history •••• This world 
spirit is the final tribunal and judge of the 
nations. There is no international state or court 
which passes judgment upon the peoples, and none 
is possible. The judgment of the nations is found 
in the fate which awaits them in the process of 
world history.31 
It is interesting to note that Hegel felt that there 
11Was an ethical element in war. That is to say, that war has 
//the positive value of unifying a nation as well as guarding 
·I 
//against stagnation, which Hegel felt would be a result of 
i 
II 11Eternal Peace. 11 Hegel writes, 
· History shows phases which illustrate how success-
ful wars have checked internal unrest and have 
strengthened the entire stability of the State. 
In peace, civic life becomes more extended, every 
sphere is hedged in and grows immobile, and at 
last all men stagnate, their· particular nature be-
coming more and more hardened and ossified.32 
:Hegel also felt that the Prussian state would be the dominant 
} state during his lifetime, but that this state would be re-
placed by an even higher state, which Hegel felt was Americaf3 
31stace, HP, 438. ' 
32Loewenberg, (ed). HS, 464-465. 
33 8 Sibree, HPH, 7. 
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The Goal of Education 
Now, what are some of the educational implications 
l:of this position? First, the creation of a moral man is the 
aim of education, that is to say, an education which would 
' 
. ' 
make the mind free. Or, the aim of education is to help the 
II 
~individual obtain full or true consciousness. 
, . 
Now, since the· aim of education, from Hegel 1s point 
lor view, has been established, the means toward the achieve-
~ent must be considered. 
Hegel states, 11Man becomes what a man should be only 
through culture. 1134 This seems to imply that outside a 
culture an individual cannot attain freedom. That is, an 
:individual can only achieve freedom when he is a member of a 
I 
culture. He becomes free in the sense that he, as .an 
individual, recognizes the rights of others and, by so doing, 
acquires rights. Hegel states, 
Thus, just as far as people have duties to fulfill 
toward it [the state], they also have rights •••• 
By virtue of the ethical fabric, man has rights so 
far as he has duties.35 
McCluskey states, in reference to Hegel, 
As a mere individual isolated fromtthe community 
man cannot ascend above savagery. It is only when 
man comes--to avail himself of the aggregate obser-
vation of mankind that he is placed in a position 
34Luqueer, RAE~ 108. 
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to get a worthWhile inventory of the world.36 
Hegel claims that an infant is potentially rational 
~nd, if this potential is to be actualized, certain rules of 
~everopment must be recognized. 
II 
•: 
il· 
The child is implicitly by his nature, a rational 
being; but his reason is merely potential in the 
shape of natural ability or aptitude. The first 
step in the educa-tional process is to gain res.pect 
of outward authority or to be disciplined not from 
within, since he can•t do this, but from external 
forces, namely the parent.37 
aut as a result of addi.tional education, this outward 
kuthority can be lessened. In other words, as the child 
krows older, outward authority is gradually being r·eplaced 
I by self-discipline. Hegel states, 
But through instruction and education his own inner 
powers are awakened and he becomes consc±ous that 
knowledge, morality, and religion belong to his own-
nature. Education and instruction then aim at 
making him for himself--actually what he is at 
first potentially.38 
The Responsibil~ty of the Family in Education 
The main function of the family, as a unit, is to 
see that their children are given the training that will 
enable them to become effective. members of the state .• 
B6McK1 us key, PSME, 121. 
37~ckenzie, HE, 63. 
38Ibid • , 64 • 
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n fhis function is also shared by other institutions, but 
~rimarily is the responsibility of the family and the school. 
II . . 
':'If the family does not do its share of the work, and also 
~upport the authority of the school in regard to this, the 
;~chool and therefore the child will suffer .u39 Hegel states, 
I 1It is only by common and harmonious effort of parent and 
.peacher that anything can be done to counteract grave ~aults. 1AO Hegel also suggests that when the child comes to 
i ~chool from the family, he must be trained to lead a social 
~ . ~ life, "since the child is potentially a social being.u 
II 
lfiegel, needless to say, would respond negatively to the 
~uggestion of Rousseau that the student should be educated I , 
~part from the culture, because 11he who is a stranger to the ~aws of the world, cannot succeed in it. 1142 In a later 
.lssay, Hegel responds to a suggestion made by many of the 
.educators of that time: 
II In modern education much harm has resulted from the maxim that children are early to be brought out into 
society--that they are to have their fill of the 
pleasures and excitements of grown people. Experi-
ence refutes this. It shows that men, who have laid 
a prudent inner foundation, and who have been brought 
I 
39Ibid. , . 92 • 
40Luqueer, HAE, 90. 
41Mackenzie, HE, 90. 
42Luqueer, HAE, 148. 
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up in moral habits, learn quickly ehough how to act 
properly in society.43 
The Classical Curriculum 
On the other hand, the cl~ssical curriculum would 
b:egin its program with what Hegel called Hsomething exaltedu 
. I • 
ilo that the students can use these forms to change his own 
invi;onment. uThe spirit and aim of our school is prepar-\! 
~tion for lear~ed pursuits (University Studies)--a prepar-1! 
ation based indeed on the study of the Greek and Roman 
I! 44 ~lassies. n The rationale for such a program was that the 
~ . 
student in his study of the classics would be required to 
II 
confront an unfamiliar language, llthe acquirement of which 
'exercises the mind in observing, comparing, generalizing, 
abstracting, judging, and reasoning. 1•45 Here, a case could 
' 
.be made for the similarity of Hegel's view and that of 
II . . 
Herbart. We come to know something when we come into contact 
I 
with something that is different •. 
j Then from the point of view of language La tin and 
Greek being unfamiliar, unconnected with every day 
life, emphasize.s the sense of something foreign 
and remote, while the time occupied in overcoming 
the difficulties involved in learning them, seems 
to mark out the distance transversed.46 
43Ibid., 148-149. 
44Mackenzie, HE, 118. 
45~., 119. 
46Luqueer, HAE, 120. 
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~lso, 11Latin grammar was regarded more important than the 
i 
mother tongue since it required considerably more thought 
. 47 i 
than a familiar language." Hege1 says., 
j: The value of grammatical study can scarcely be over-
estimated, for it forms the beginning of logical 
culture, a fact, however, that appears to be almost 
overlooked. Grammar has for its subject-matter the 
categories, the peculiar products and determinations 
of the reason. With its study, therefore, the study 
of reason itself is begun. These essentials of 
intelligence, which grammar deals with, are easily 
grasped by a child. The abstractions are simple. 
They are, as it were, the single letters and 
vocables of the mind with which we learn to spell it 
out, so to speak, and then to read and interpret it. 
The pupil is· made to distinguish shades of meaning. 
And it is most important that these differences be 
made a subject of study. For since the determin-
ations of reason, we being reasoning beings, are in 
us, and since we understand them immediately, the 
first work--of' education is to put them wholly in 
our possession, that is, to make them objects of 
consciousness designated by appropriate names •48 
i[egel also makes reference to the< Hparti tion wall by means of 
khich this separation from self, so necessary for education, 
[
I s affected~ 1149 
There is :Little to conclude that Hegel advocated any 
pecial method to teach literature and grammar. Mackenzie 
bomments in this connection, 11The pupil must be led to think 
)
bbout grammar and literature, and no mere rote learning would 
suffice, but beyond this general requirement he followed 
II 
II 
47Ibid., 122. 
48Ibid., 155. ij 
II 49Mackenzie, . HE, 67 .. 
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'' 
' 
£rom Hegel's viewpoint, the whole:of the educational process 
' 
'' ~hould lead, in the end, to a moral individual. To 
.accomplish this, one must first dictate the actions of the 
bhild and then gradually develop inner discipline to replace 
1~he outward authority that was prevalent in the first stage 
:bf moral training • 
Now, specifically, how was this to be accomplished? 
First, by uexample; moral atmosphere (including discipline); 
lfecond, indirect moral instruction through the arts and the 
~ciences; third, direct moral instruction. 115l 
In the first stage, example plays an important role; 
this stage takes place in the early stages of development. 
iffegel states, JtGood example, surrounding them in daily.life, 
' 52 is the best training for children. 11 He further comments, 
It is this or that man who is the ideal which the 
boy strives to understand and to imitate.. It is 
only in this concrete way that the child, at this 
stage, becomes acquainted with himself. Accordingly, 
what the boy is to learn must be set before him by 
authority and discipline.53 
rlso in this first stage discipline plays its most important 
role. Hegel asserts, 
50Ibid • , 127 • 
51 Ibid. , 13 0 • 
52 Ibid. 
53Luqueer, HAE, 122. 
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The boy is n0t to be allowed to follow his own whim 
and fancy. He must learn to obey in order to 
command. Obedience is the beginning of all wisdom. 
For by this, the boy's Will is brought under the 
reasonable will imposed from without. The boy's 
will is not yet fledged, not truly independent and 
free. It has not yet learned;to see the true, the 
objective which makes for righteousness. Soon, 
there appears in the child an evil self will. This 
must be broken by discipline (i.e. transmuted into 
good will, by instilling of more generous motives.)54 
!Also, in this first stage punishment plays its most impor-
ltant role. 
In the second stage Hegel felt that th~ individual 
.~as to be educated ~ndirectly. In this stage Hegel made no 
sharp distinction between intellectual and moral training; 
in fact, moral training is largely the training of the mind. 
) The third stage is indirect moral training. In this 
l)area, Hegel had a wealth of experience, since for some eight 
,years he gave all the religious, moral, and philosophical 
instruction to the boys in the gymnasium. He emphasized that 
this type ofreligious instruction should appeal to the 
!.intellect. 11If religion be a matter of feeling alone, it 
flickers down to something idleless. It becomes inoperative, 
and so, loses all determined content.u55 Hegel's program, 
at this stage, begins with a theory of right, duty, and 
religion which was taught in the freshman year of the 
secondary school. At this time, the boys were encouraged to 
54rbid • , 123 • 
55Mackenzie, HE, 132. 
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:' 
~eflect upon their religious training that they had received 
II · 
~t the elementary level. · · 
I Hegel considered Right and Justice in connection with 
! .~he individual as well as the conununity; thus the freedom of 
~he individual has to be seen in relation to a larger whole. 
~n religion, such ideas as conscience, faith, meaning of 
~eligion, God and His attributes, and sin are dealt with. 
~ . 
~n the second course, cosmology, natural theology, psychology, 
~nd logic are studied. 
q 
., In the third course, Hegel dealt with 11 the funda-
l! ental logical ideas underlying all knowledge, and their 
II · · process to apply these to a consideration of all the various 
lciences.u56 After this comes the philosophy of the mind 
.hich includes psychology, that is, "the realization of the 
'I . . : P11nd through moral life and conduct, and in the life of the 
~tate. u57 After completion of such a program, "no boy could 
~eave school without some insight,into the value and meaning 
~f life and sense of human responsibility and destiny. u58 
It also should be made clear at this point that, when Hegel 
I 
'Jalks about any specific recommendation, such as the latter, 
'I p.e refers to the education of boys. He. states, uwomen can, 
~f course be educated, but their minds are not adapted to 
,I ~he higher sciences, philosophy, or certain arts.n59 
56Ibid-., 140. -
57 Ibid., 141. 
58rbid. · 
59oyde, HPR, 172. 
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CHAPTER III 
WILLIAM TORREY HARRIS ' GENERAL PHILOSOPHICAL 
POSITION AND HIS EDUCATIONAL POSITION 
The Harris Family and Early Education 
·~ 
William Torrey Harris was born on a small farm in II 
II 
North Killingly 3 Connecticut, on November 5, 1835. At the 
·I 
~ge of four, he attended what is now referred to as a 11little 
'fed school house," Where his Aunt Catherine, While still in 
her teens, was the teacher. Some years later, Harris ~~egarded these years as significant years in shaping his 
~i:re. He claimed this unique education "unlike that of all 
bther educative agencies which came later.ul In these 
karma ti ve years, Harris developed a great love for reading, ~argely as a result of hls mother •s influence. Before he l~inished the primary school, his family left Connecticut and I . . . . . 
;went to Providence, Rhode Island. Here, Harris was regis-
~ered in the local public school~ ·He seemed rather troubled 
in this new situation because of the formal atmosphere of the 
school as compared to the informa,lity or the earlier public 
school in Connecticut~ "In particular, he disliked the 
30 
~rtinet system intensely and in general had nothing good to 
11 . )12 . : ~ay about the school. Later, he entered several private 
:I 
academies and seemed to have an intense dislike for all of 
if them. One must not assume that, qecause he attended several 
secondary schools, he was attempting to find one to his 
liking. The reason seemed to be that, among the well-to-do, 
this was the accepted practice. 
One of Harris' closest friends at Woodstock Academy 
~nd later at Yale wrote of Harris that his 
genial and kindly manners, his purity of character 
his high ideals, his eagerness in search for know-
ledge and truth, in all things. He was already at 
the age of fifteen a philosopher--a lover of know-
ledge and not content with surface-knowledge, but 
anxious to get at the foundations of things, and to 
go as far as the human is capable of penetrating.3 II wn fact, at the age of fifteen 
\rThe Faculties of the Mind. 11 
he ,wrote an essay entitled 
II ~ale. 
I 
In 1854, after graduating'from Andover, he entered 
While at Yale, Harris was a rebellious young man who 
1l1became converted to phrenology, mesmerism, and the claims 
.':~.nd promises of •natural science, .J repudiated a good deal of 
I . 
vhe orthodox Congregationalism with which he had been 
~ndoctrinated .. 114 Some years later, when Harris had an 
ppportunity to reflect upon this stage of his life, he claimec 
2Ibid., 36. 
3rbid., 38. 
4curti, SIAE, 311. 
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II 
that this was merely one of the stages that an individual 
~oes through in his intellectual growth. Harris left Yale 
~fter two years not because of academic or financial 
tlifficulties, but because he was dissatisfied with the 
educatiop he was receiving. 
Teacher in St. Louis 
After he left Yale, Harris went to st. Louis where~ 
after several business failures, he taught shorthand and 
penmanship. In his early years in the St. Louis school 
system, he met and married Sarah T. Bugbee. Also, at 
approximately this time , he met Henry C. Brockmeyer who was 
to have a profound influence on him. 
His advancement in the st. Louis school system was 
indeed rapid. He advanced from instructor to principal to 
superintendent of schools in twelve years. 
During these twelve years, his faith in phrenology 
and in natural science was shaken. There is little 
evidence to explain how this happened. 
Journal of Speculative Philosophy 
Also~ while employed by the city of st. Louis, 
Harris was influential in the establishment of the Journal of 
Speculative Philosophy. The main reasons for its establish-
~ent can be traced to the time when Henry Brockmeyer became 
32 
fascinated with Hegel. At a meeting of the St. Louis 
Philosophical Society, Brockmeyer was successful in inter-
esting the young Harris in Hegel 1s thought.5 Shortly after-
wards~ the Kant Club was initiated as a division of the 
St. Louis Philosophical Society. The name Kant Club can be 
misleading since it implies that its members were followers 
of Kant. However~ this is not the case, since the membership 
was primarily interested in Hegel, and decided to work 
"their way back from Hegel through his predecessors to Kant, 
the first begetter of German Id.ealism to see precisely what 
was the transcendentalism which Hegel transcended. 116 
However, the. Journal would have never been founded if 
the members of the Kant Club felt that they had the oppor-
tunity to articulate their ¥iews in one of the well-
established journals. The fact that this was impli!:obable 
Fecame apparent to the Kant Club when the North American 
~keview rejected one of Harris' articles. In fact~ one of 
the readers, Chauncey Wright, claimed that the article was 
:j I 
11the mere husk of Hegelism, dogmatic, without the only merit 
of dogmatism, distinction of definition. u7 After receiving a 
~ejection slip, the young Harris suggested that they 
! 
il 
establish their own organ to communicate what was lacking in 
II 
l 5see pp. 1-2. 
6Anderson and Fisch, PA, 472. 
7 Ibid • , 4 7 4 • 
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.. other journals. One can conclude that the rejection of 
Harris 1 article was the efficientcause that led to the 
,. 
!!establishment of the first philosophical journal in America, 
1~ut certainly not the sufficient cause. 
1/ 
The first assignment of the enthusiastic editorial 
IFoard was to agree on a motto, which reads, 11 Philosophy can 
bake no bread, but it can give us God, Freedom, and 
II 
,Immortality. H8 One commentator felt that 11Hegel far more 
lrhan Kant brought Harris God, Freedom, and. Immortality .. u9 
'i 
., 
Concord Period 
After holding the position of superintendent of 
schools in St. Louis for some twelve years (1868-1880), 
Harris resigned and moved to Concord, Massachusetts. There, 
he and Bronson Alcott established a school of philosophy 
that, for nine years, gave summer courses in philosophy.· 
HBehind the Concord Summer School of Philosophy (1877-1887), 
'I . 
'hich Alcott and Harris organized, there was this hope and 
blan to bring New E~glarid Transcendentalism and Western 
I 
l!lemocratic idealism together. But, ,East and West merely met 
II 
at Concord, for by this time neither movement had enough 
Vitality left to launch a major philosophic tradition. 11 lO 
II 
8schaub, (ed.)_, WTH, 31. 
9rbid. 
lOschneider, SLMP, 184. 
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N~vertheless, the school was well attended and such distin-
g~ished men as William James, John Dewey," Ralph Emerson, Hiram 
!\ 
J~nes, Bronson Alcott, and Harris himself lectured at the 
II 
s !,hool. After the death of Alcott and after Harris' acceptanc~ 
o 1 the post of United States Commissioner of Education, the 
ecflY enthusiasm that characterized the early years seemed to 
le.ssen and the school .came to a close in 1887. 
Harris, as the fourth United States Commissioner of 
Education, was constantly plagued by the amount of detail 
I) 
t~s position demanded. Also bearing ill health, he had little 
1\ 
11 t1 J1le to give to writing and thinking • He resigned when he was 
of~ered a retirement grant from the Carnegie Foundation for 
II 
tbe Advancement of Teaching. One is led to believe that Harris 
II · 11 
di~ not retire earlier because of his financial insecurity. 
I Un~ortunately, this retirement was short since Harris died of a 
II 
I p.e~rt failure three years latere 
Harris 1 D.efini tion of Philosophy 
There may be some truth in the adage that a man's 
de~inition of philosophy indicates his point of view. 
Ha~ris' definition certainly indicates his view since he 
~etines philosophy as "an attempt to explain the facts and 
~v];nts in the world by referring them all to one first 
1/ pr nciple which he has discovered or generalized and 
' 11Leidecker, YT, 577. 
35 
-~ndertakes to explain all things by means of this principle, 
I 
I .1112 h [le becomes a ph1.losopher. When one arrives at t e level 
~f explaining all there is, he al~o has the responsibility 
I fo assist in solving the practical problems that face 
~ociety. Harris writes that his friend, Henry Brokmeyer, 
/(impressed us with the practicality of philosophy, inasmuch 
'as he could flash into the question of the day, or even into 
II 
the question of the moment, the highest insight of philosophy 
and solve their problem. Philosophy came to mean, therefore, 
,!the most practical of all species. of knowledge. u13 
Space 1 Time, and Cause 
Let us fi:rst turn to the former problem, that of the 
nature and problem that philosophical investigation encoun-
ters according to Harris. ·First, the starting point of a 
philosophical system begins with a consideration of space, 
rtime, and cause • 
I In regard to space, we find that object is dependent 
i 
on space for its existence. But, in order to conceive an 
,object existing in space, we have to understand the object's 
I 
!1/ environment. 11We find ourselves necessitated to think an 
environment in order to think the object as a limited 
1114-object. One must admit that the object and the 
i' II l 2Harris, HL, 1. 
13Harris, HL, XIII. 
14Harris, ISP, 17. 
e 
II ~nvironment depend for their existence on space, since 
II 
"is pace makes both possible. Space is a necessary idea. 1115 
Also,~ space "does not cease with the object nor with the 
I 16 
environment • 11 In other words, space is infinite. 
,, Time, on the other hand, is essentially different II . 
tfrom space. While "space is the condition of the existence 
r! 
, ~f things, time is the condition of the existence of all 
' 
kvents or changes. 1117 Similar to space, time is infinite~ 
II 
If we say time is finite, we are contradictory, because a 
II 
1~hing must have a beginning to be finite; to have a beginning 
I 
'~nfers a utime before it in which it was not. ui8 
" We l The third and most important idea is causality. 
df.'ind that the environment can cause change in an object. I 
iBut, when acted upon, the object is also a cause. For 
example, in order to have heat melt wax, the wax must be 
meltable. If it were not meltable, the heat would have 
itittle effect on the wax. So, since wax is meltable, it is 
~n itself also a cause Thus, cause and effect are "both 
rctive, although one i~ relatively passive to the other."19 
II 
II 
II 
I' 
-
17Ibid ., 18. 
18Ibid., 19. 
19f£!.<!., 20. 
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Since an effect ~plies a cause, then, one can ask 
what caused the cause and so on; but for Harris, causality 
. 20 implies a first cause or first principle. Self-cause, 
writes Harris, His the principle of life, of thought, of 
~ind,--the idea of a creative activ~ty, and hence also the 
21 1basis of theology as well as philosophy. n In a later work, 
I 
Harris states, "our idea of cause, therefore, is the nucleus 
of our idea of an absolute. It is the basis of our idea of 
freedom, of moral responsibility, of selfhood, of immortal-
ity, and finally, of God.. 1122 Self-cause can al;so be 
explained, according to Harris, by examining the relationship 
of dependent and independent being.23 That is, all being 
must be dependent or independent, and 11dependent being can 
'I 
l
be explained only by the independent being from which it 
I . 24 
receives·its nature. 11 Independent being is identified with 
!~ self-cause or first principle. 
In order to arrive at a first principle, man must go 
II 
1beyond mere sense perceptions a stage of knowing which 
ii 
Harris calls atheistic because "it finds each thh"'o-f! ~·-o 
I, 
I 
20Ibid ., 22. 
21Ibid. 
22Harris, PFE, 57 0 
,, 23Harris, ISP, 25. 
24Ibid., 22. 
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I 25 
'sufficient for itself. JJ In other words, sense perception 
alone concludes that the things of thematerial wonld Hare 
I 26 
the essential elements of all being • 11 At the second stage 
of knonng, the mind discovers that 11 each thing relates to 
I 
each otner, and there is reciprocal or mutual dependence.a27 
il 
The third and highest stage of mental activity is that of 
insight or pure reason. At this stage, one 11sees the world 
as explained by the principle of 1Absolute Reason. 1 That is, 
one finds that the world is in harmony with the principle of 
'Absolute Reas.on. 1 H28 
In summary, sense perception is only conscious of the 
16bject, while the second stage finds that things are related 
II . 
land dependent on other objects for their existence. The I . 
final stage is characterized by having logical presupposi-
11tions which explain reality. That is to say, such ideas as 
~~ime, space, and causality make the existence of objects and 
rheir environment possible.29 
25Harris 3 PFE, 35. 
26Ibid ., 33. 
27 Ibid. 
-
28Ibid., 23. 
29Harris , IS P, 125. 
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Freedom 
This highest stage of knowing implies freedom. 
Harris writes that Hthe third stage of knoWing is the 
; 
contemplation of the form of totality, which being self-
determined is free.u30 In other words, to be free is to be 
self-determined; not to be free means to be determined by 
other than one's self. Harris concludes dogmatically that 
11the first principle can reveal or manifest itself only in 
free beings.n31 However, one can draw the opposite conclu-
~ion from this argument. That is, man is not free. For 
~xample, if being is either dependent or independent and man 
~S. dependent, then man is not free because he is determined 
~nd dependent on something other than himself--namely an 
•I 
independent being which is free. 
II Harris also rejects the fatalist's contention that ~he Will acts out or necessity since 1t merely responds to 
i; ~he strongest motive. Harris finds this objection to freedom 
:I 
~ased on a false assumption; that is, the fatalist assumes 
.. fthat the motives are ready made in the mind without any 
~clition on the part of the individual. Harris, on the 
il ' 
other hand, feels that 11the mind creates the motives by its 
~hinking, and creates its realization by its will, activitY, 
I .. 
30rbid. , 265. 
3lrbid., 269 0 
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·'and hence is doubly creative, doubly free • 1132 Here, Harris 
'fails to distinguish between the physical motives of food, 
air, and discharge, and from other types of motives which 
1
p.re influenced b.y individual volition. 
I/ Let us consider the second aspect of a philosophical 
~~ystem according to Harris--that is, its application to 
~ractical situations.33 Harris contends that the major ~~nstitutions of society are the family, civil society, state, 
,, 
~nd church.34 These institutions arise because the I! 
individual wishes to protect and preserve his freedom. 
~arris writes, 0by social combination, each gives his 
~ndividual mite to the whole and receiving in form the 
I ~ggregate gift the social whole thus making him rich by an 
ll-nfini te return* 1135 Harris insists that, .. nne must not regard 
~hese institutions as agencies that infringe upon individual 
Preedom since, without these institutions, freedom would be ~on-existent. Thus, the dualism, made popular by nineteenth 
eentury philosophers, such as Mill, of the individual versus 
~he state, was considered by Harris to be false. Harris 
c dmits that the state does infringe upon formal freedom as <~pposed to substantial freedom. He states, 
32rbid., 278. 
33see pp. 35-36: 
34rfarris, Art., 11CSS, u 216.. 
35Harris, Art., flpMS," 439. 
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Formal freedom is the freedom to attempt whatever 
one chooses; substantial freedom is the freedom 
of the race, which one individual shares with the 
rest by willing what is in accordance with the 
nature of self-activity, and therefore cooperates 
with the moral end of all men.36 
The School and its Relation to other Institutions 
The institution of the school, although not listed 
Irs a major institution, is related to the other- major 
jfnstitutions. As an educator, it is not surprising to find 
IH:arris attempting to relate the school to the other ins ti-
~~utions in order to see what role the school must assume. 
Beginning with the family and its relation to the 
school, Harris affirms that the family should "give to the 
l~ndividual, training in personal habits, respect for elders 
lknd superiors, obedience to rule, a sense of shame, family 
;piety, and above all, the use of his mother tongue."37 
!I 
Here, the mother assumes much of the responsibility. 
Harris writes, 
It does not so much matter what the statistics will 
show, as it does matter that the growth of her 
child, and learning that constitutes a stage of 
progress, and how to discover and remove obstacles 
to his growth, as well as to afford judicious aid 
to the child's effort at mastering the use of his 
:faculties-.38 · 
36Harris, Art., 11EFES, 11 5. 
37 Harris , Art. , ucss, .. 217 • 
38Harris, Art. , 11EFES, 11 21 • 
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youngster enters school, he severs some of his 
ntal ties and his conduct will no longer be largely 
termined by his family, but by the school. Harris writes, 
The chief consideration is the requirement of the 
civilization into which the child is born, has 
determined not only what he shall study in the 
school, but.what habits and customs he shall be 
taught in the family before the school age arrived, 
as well as that he shall acquire a skilled acquaint-
ance with one of a definite series.of trades, pro-
fe.ssions or vocations in the years that follow · 
school; and furthermore, that this question of the 
relation of the pupil to his civilization deter-
mines what religious faith or spiritual aspiration 
shall be adapted for the conduct of his life.39 
school must also assume the responsibility of 
giving the child knowledge-and skill in the techni-
calities of the world, science, litexature, anq 
history 1 ---the conventionalities of inteTiigence 
as they have been called by a great thinker [the 
reference here seems to be to Horace Mann--R. L.] 
reading, writing, and arithmetic.40 
us, between the institution of the family and civil 
there is a fifth institution Hpartaking somewhat of 
institutions named as cardinal.n4l Harris doesn•t 
'give a great deal of attention to the relationship between 
I the school and civil society. However, he does make 
!indirect references to this relationship. The civil society 
!contains the business world, as well as the instruments of 
3%arris, Art., )'RCF, H 41. 
4°Harris, Art., J'css, 11 218. 
41 6 Ibid., 21 ., 
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II 
production that are connected with business. The primary 
interest of this institution is to provide some service to 
1\ 
'I !the community in order to make a profit or collect a 
salary. Harris feels that the school does not have the 
direct responsibility of equipping individuals with certain 
skills to sustain themselves. Harris states, 11After the 
schools come the education of one•s vocation, trade, or 
42 business in life.H Here, we find that Harris makes an 
important distinction between professional education and, 
what may be termed, liberal education. Thus, the school 
II 
Erovides an education which differs from the professional 
school. However., it must also be inserted that the school 
. ks not the only educative institution. Harris writes, 11The 
lfschool, however, though its sole function is to educate, it 
il 
is not by any means the only educative institution. 1143 
II 
II 
!:state. 
Let us now turn to the relation of the school to the 
Harris looks upon the state as an important edu-
cational insti.tution,· although the state, as such, does not 
establish schools. Harris writes., uFor it is a well under-
llstood principle in our American Civilization that the parti-
11ci pa tiori of the citizens in the making of his own government 
li 
1\in the election of his representatives for making and 
administering laws is an education of a very important ld.nd.1144 
42rbid., 218. 
43rbid., 216. 
44Ibid., 211. 
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Turning now to the relationship of the school to the 
church, Harris insists that the school must assume a neutral 
position in regard to any religious doctrine. In fact, he 
opposed Bible reading in schools.45 Harris also opposed the 
suggestion of finding a common denominator of all major 
religions and teaching this common denominator in the school 
because this practice would be the equivalent to teaching a 
new religion. Harris writes, 
We must conclude, therefore, that the prerogative of 
religious instruction is in the church, that it must 
remain in the church, and that, in the nature of 
things, it cannot be farmed out to the secular school 
without degenerating into mere deism b~reft of a 
living Providence, or else changing the school into 
a parochial school and destroy~ the efficiency of 
seeu-lar instruction. The necessity of considering 
the rights of conscienee of all citizens in the 
state schools renders it impossible to bring in 
religious ·ceremonial or teach doctrines that are 
distinctively denominational •••• Even the doctrine 
of the existence of God implies a specific conception 
of Him, and the conception of the divine varies from 
that of the finite deity of animism to the infinite 
deity of East Indian pantheism and the Holy Bible.46 
The Aim of Education 
Since the role of the school and its relationship to 
other institutions have been established, we can now look 
specifically at the school, its aims, and the means toward 
I! 
the actualization of its aims. 
45Leidecker, YT, 429. 
46Harris, M. c. N.E*A. Proceedings, 1903, 360. 
45 
Education, for Harris, is to enable the individual 
!to become free. HEduca tion was for him in the first 
instance, •mediation'; that is to say, it was the process 
1bf connecting the self with a larger whole, a beginning of 
self-entanglement .u47 Harris writes, 
education is the process of the adoption of the 
social order in place of one's more animal caprice. 
But, it is the adoption of a consistent course of 
action instead of a self-contradictory one; and 
hence it is a renunciation of the freedom of the 
moment for the freedom that has the form of 
eternitY·48 
Harris thus believes that the individual, upon entrance to 
the school, is egotistical. And, one of the major functions 
,of the school is to help the individual in such a way that he 
or she will be able to see their actions not only from a 
lrimited perspective but a1so from a wider perspective and 
therefore, to help the student to decenter himself. Harris 
calls this process self-entanglement ''which implies that, if 
~~he mental powers were allowed to develop naturally, they 
' . ~ould become antagonistic to, or at least out of harmony 
I' 4 ~ith, the demands of society. 11 9 ~Thus, through education, 
II . 
the individual will gradually replace formal freedom, that 
is, the freedom to do what one pleases~ disregarding to a 
II lfarge extent, the needs of other members of society, with 
II 
47McCluskey, PSME, 127. 
48aarris, PFE, 282. 
4%oberts, WTH, 41. 
46 
\\substantial freedom_, which is the ability to condition 
one's action in such a manner as to take into consideration 
11 
the rights of others .5° Thus, education must keep this aim 
in mind and condition their actions in such a manner that 
II 
llth:i.s aim can be realized. Harris asserts, 
The highest motive, therefore is the moral motive. 
All will power is consolidated into one power, the 
'1'1 will of the social whole~ which has for its aim 
the object of assessing the action of all. This is 
· what Hegel refers to as 'pure will. • Thus the will ~~~~. has infinite power to determine itself. God endowed 
man with self-determination_, so that he might have 
the possibility of infinite progress.51 ~his same point is made more explicit in a later article by 
I 
~arris. He writes, 
! 
Man alone, in his intelligence and will, reveals 
the prineiple of self-activity, for man possesses 
the capacity for infinite culture. He can grow in 
holiness forever, by the exercise of his self-
activity.52 · · 
It has been pointed out that the family must assume 
~ertain responsibilities in moral education.53 Let us now 
look at the school to see more specifically how it contri-11 
$utes to self-entanglement. Harris writes that the 
II 
II 
II I 
school possesses very great advantage over the 
family in this matter of teaching respect for the 
law. The parent is too near the child, too 
personal to teach him this lesson.54 
50riarris, Art • , "'EFES, 11 5. 
51Harris, Art., 11 PSEUS, 11 38. 
5 2Harris _, Art., HpMS, u 438-439. 
53 see pp. 42-43. · 
54Harris, Art., 11MECS, 11 129. 
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lAlso, Harris claims that, 
to one who is familiar with the methods of schools 
it is not surprising to find that the school had a 
favorable effect on the morals of the pupil. In 
the well disciplined school, the pupil is first 
taught to be silent and industrious, attentive, 
and critical in his mental habits •••• The great 
advantage of school instruction in morality is the 
fact that the pupil is made to do and practice 
these fundamental moral acts of self control, and 
is not merely made to hear lectures on the subject, 
and exhortations without accompanying discipline in 
moral habits.55 
Harris points to the fact that there is a direct relation-
ship between people who are convicted of felonies and 
illiteracy to support his contention that people who are 
educated are less apt to commit crimes. Harris fails to 
point out that one could interpret this fact to mean that 
people who are educated are not any more moral, but are less 
lapt to get caught for any crime they conunit since they have 
k higher developed intellect, and thus, are in a better 
position to avoid conviction and apprehensiono 
II In brief, moral education becomes the inculcation of 
'I 
" ~orrect ideas and habits. 
~s--what means does Harris 
II 
objective.? 
The question that needs answering 
propose to accomplish this 
First, since an individual, upon entering the school, 
has not developed any significant degree of self-d~scipline, 
then 11we must retain the prescriptive element in education 
55Harris , Art • , "CSS, Jt 226 o 
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'' 
and insist on implicit obedience to prescribed rules at 
\,first. u56 The notion, that the child will follow his animal 
ittendencies if left to his own volition, is the basis Harris 
uses to s·uggest that education should begin with obedience .57 
The process by which the child overcomes these animal tenden-
cies, that is, the process by which he or she learns to 
:become self-disciplined is called self-entanglement. In 
.brief, the doctrine of self-entanglement implies that man 
llhas two selves, a physical o:ver against the spiritual self. 
IIHarris writes, 
II 
I! 
li 
As man ascends out of Nature in time and space into 
human nature, he ascends into a realm of freedom. 
At this stage the individuals must feel or perceive 
a common interest with other individuals. He must 
adopt for his own ideal the ideal of others.. Then 
dropping his exclusiveness, he works for others and 
through others for himself. He learned his own 
essential aim and purpose in those of others, and 
more and more to make a common ideal the object in 
his striving endeavors•58 
The Five Windows of the Soul 
What role do the academic subjects play in the edu-
bational scheme? In order to understand why Harris believes 
rhat certain subjects should be taken, we must first see what 
!r'elationship the so-called ufive windows of the soul" have 
I 
Ito his educational theory. The five windows of the soul, 
5~arris, HE, XIII. 
57Harris, PFE, 289. 
58Ibid. 
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II 
open out upon five great divisions of the life of 
man. Two of these relate to man•s comprehension 
and conquest over nature, the rea~ of 'time and 
space. Arithmetic furnishes the survey of what-
ever has the form of time, all series and succes&~ 
sions of individuals, all quantitative being 
mastered by the aid of the art of reckoning • The 
geographical window of the soul, the survey extends 
to organic and inorganic Nature. The surface of 
the earth, its concrete relation to man as he habi-
tates and as the producer of his food, clothing, 
shelter, and the means of intercommunication which 
unites the fragments of humanity into one grand 
man-all these important matters are introduced to 
the pupil through the study of geography, and spread 
out as a panorama before the second window of the 
soUl ••• The study of history of one•s native 
country in the elementary school opens the window 
of the soul which looks out upon the spectacle of 
the will power of his nation •••• Grammar opens 
to the child his views of the inner workings of the 
mind of the race, and helps insofar to a comprehen-
sion of his own spiritual life. Literature, 
finally, is the most accessible, opinion, and con-
vication of a people; of their ideas, language, 
aspiration. The fifth window of the soul looks 
out upon the revelation of human nature through 
literature.59 
Thus, we have the curriculum dealing with five major 
categories: mathematics, literature, geography, history, 
land grammar • 
Sequence of Subject Matter 
Another important point is the order and the 
II 
~~equence that these subjects must be taught: 
II 
1: 
II 
II 
I· 
that each branch develops in an order suited to the 
natural and easy progress of the child, so that 
each step is taken at the proper time to help 
59Ibid., 332. 
50 
advance him to the next stage in the same branch, 
or to the next stage in an other related branch 
of the course of studY·60 
!For example, the study of man's physical make-up would 
I . 
begin with a study of plants, proceed to animals, and 
finally to man. Grammar would lead to logic and psychology, 
while history would provide the grounds for the study of 
!!sociology. Harris writes , 
The scientific method prevailing in our time tells 
us that to know a subject properly we must study 
it in its history. We must be acquainted with its 
embryology and growth •. Greek and Rome originated 
the stock of ideas that form the basis of our 
institutions. To know ourselves, to realize our 
past history, and to make alive within ourselves 
the consciousness of the development of our civili-
zation, we must for a period come into close 
contact with the literature in which Greek and Rome 
portrayed their national life ..... So to under-
stand the frog we must study the tadpole rather 
than the turtle•61 
Latin and Greek 
Let us now turn to classical languages which Harris 
regards as extremely important. He comments, 
They must be of such a kind that they lead the 
individual out of his immediate and familiar sur-
roundings, and cause him to breathe the atmosphere 
and become familiar with the accessory conditions 
of an earlier historical stage of the people from 
whom he derives his culture and forms of civili-
zation.62 
60Harris, N.E.A. Proceedings, 1895, 41. 
61Harris, Art o, JJCSFPSU, lJ. 530 .. 
62Harris , Art • , ''FLGE, 11 3 • 
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II The study of Latin and Greek has priority in the course of 
study over other subjects because it not only brings the 
student into unfamiliar surroundings,·but also demands a 
high reasoning ability. Harris writes, 
One may say that of a hundred boys, fifty of whom 
had studied La tin for a period of six months, while 
the other fifty had never studied Latin at all, the 
I<~ fifty with the smattering of Latin would possess 
some slight impulse toward organizing the legal and 
political view of human life, and surpass the other 
fifty in this direction. • • • In the same way, a 
smattering of Greek, through the subtle effect of the· 
vocabulary and form of Greek grammar, would give 
some slight impulse, not otherwise obtained, toward 
I theoretical or aesthetical contemplation of the , world •63 l ~nether basic reason for the study of Latin and Greek is 
I; 
fhat, 
all modern states, ••• corporation, public or 
private; all forms of justice are based on the 
Roman contribution to civilization, and they are 
expressed in Latin words for the most part in all 
\I our modern language • 64 
Physical Education would be used as an instrument for 
training the will and not £or the sake of releasing excess 
6nergy. Harris states, 
" 
I 
I\ 
I! 
ri 
[' 
I. 
But the chief demand upon the .. pupil in calisthenics 
is a requirement of him to strain his attention and 
exercise his will. It is a will training to a 
greater extent than a physio16gical training. The 
great distinction between wor~ and play is this one: 
in play the mind is spontaneous, governed entirely 
by its own individuality to some external prescribed 
course of action. Calisthenics exercise is severe 
63rbid. 
64Ibid. _, 10. 
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work> and not merely any means of relaxation.65 
'' 
Higher Education 
At Boston University, Dr. Harris gave an address on 
higher education. In fact, this address is one of the few 
~imes Harris addressed himself to the area of higher edu-
bation. In this address, Harris compares the education of 
rhe elementary school to the educ~tion one might get from 
his own experience. 11We may contrast elementary and 
secondary educa~ion with the education that comes to the 
· illiterate from experience • 11~6 But·, Harris feels that the 
II 
d' 
education on the secondary and elementary levels plus the 
youngsters•own experience 11lifts up the boy or girl above 
II 
" the man or woman educated only by the school of experi-
ence .. 1167 It should also be noted that Harris did not view 
the undergraduate college as an instrument for training 
' 
people for specific oc-cupations, such as teaching, business, 
and other professions. 
The School and Soci~l Change 
Finally~ let us consider the function of the school 
in relation to social change. It would not be accurate to 
il 
simply assert that Harris did not look upon the school as an 
65Harris, N .E .A. Proceedif1gs, 1903, 360. 
I 
66Harris, Art., uUHE, " 6 ., 
67Ibid ., 
., 
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instrument for social change, as one commentator has 
68 ~uggested. Harris had a tremendous interest in the 
~ractical problems that faced America. He seemed to feel 
~hat the public school can play a role in solving these 
~roblems by helping to mold an individual to become an 
ethical person, a person whose actions would be tempered 
~ot entirely by his own need, but also the needs of his 
!fellow man. He would be an individual who respected his 
superiors, industrious, disciplined, and above all, taught 
11to respect the rights of organized industry.u69 However, 
in his recommended curriculum, Harris does not deal primarily 
:lith the present; for example, he does not mention such 
subjects as Civics, Problems of Democracy, or Sociology.7° 
II 
In other words, the school would not analyze present social 
conditions in order to have the student become more percep-
11 
~~ive of pre·s·ent conditions. It could also be suggested 
:I 
that students, emerging from this type of system, would not 
pe lacking some awareness of present conditions as well as 
'opinions about it. But, this would be largely in the form ~f fragmented inf'ormation. Further, the student, in such a 
school system, would be influenced by the views of his 
II .. 
i~eacher either directly or indirectly. That is to say, the 
68curti, SIAE, 345. 
69Ibid • , 330. 
7°Harr1s, Art., 11CSPSU. Jt 
.. 
: i 
lv:l.ews of teachers, on contemporary issues, have a tendency 
to become explicit although they are not conscious of this. 
'Bowever :1 the student would not be given the opportunity to 
analyze since there was no subject that dealt specifically 
with such matters. Take for example Harri,s :1 a man who 
advocated a strong nationalism:~ justified imperialisry.,and:~ 
at the same time:~ found no objection to the growing number 
of fortunes. It would seem that these views would have a 
tendency to influence students who came under his direction11 
II . 
In conclusion:~ the school was not a direct agent for 
social change, but was used primarily 11for preserving the 
llvalues of the past and adjusting the individual to society. •72 
7lsee:1 Curti, SIAE, 310-347. 
72 rbid. :1 345 • 
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CHAPrER IV 
CONCLUSION 
From this study~ one can conclude that Hegel's 
major influence on Harris existed in the area of social 
ph~losophy. In Hegel's social philosophy, we can see how he 
traces the mere abstract individual to concrete individuality 
The logical steps from this abstract state of nature to true 
individuality is upward through the family, civil society~ 
and finally the ethical state.1 In the final stage, Hegel 
contends that individuality has its greatest expression. 
l;trere in the state, true freedom is achieved. However, to 
'I 
achieve this freedom, one basic condition must be satisfied; 
khat is, individuals should act in such a manner that the 
rights of others are respected. Only in this manner no these 
individuals receive any rights. That is, rights are not 
., 
ttural; man is not born with them, and only achieves them s a result of his actions toward others. The problem for 
Hegel as well as for Harris was to ascertain under what ,, 
conditions such an attitude could emerge. What roles could 
the various institutions of society play in order to bring 
about freedom of self-determination? Here exists the most 
1 See pp. l5-2l. 
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important aim of the school. Thus, the school, in cooper-
~tion with other institutions, must educate in such a 
~nner that the youngster will be free. The concept of 
freedom is the basis of the educational philosophy of both 
thinkers. Let us take for example Harris 1 concept of self-
entanglement and Hegel's concept of self-estrangement.:..:: 
!Both self-estrangement and self-entanglement are synonyms in 
this case. Both concepts claim that individuals ought to 
be of such a nature that they will not act merely out of 
selfish, egotistical attitudes. Now, since the child has 
bot a~hieved such an outlook on life, the school•s first 
~esponsibility is to see that this attitude is replaced by a 
<I 
II 
llmore considerate attitude. Hegel makes this latter point by 
asserting that abstract freedom ought to be replaced by 
,concrete freedom. Harris points out that formal freedom 
ought to be replaced by substantial freedom. However., 
despite the difference in terminology, both men mean the 
j same thing in this instance • 
Let us turn to the implication of the aim of edu-
cation to make a child ethical. First, since the child is 
potentially ethical, however he is actually at the first 
stage unethical. Since the child is unethical, the first 
task education must accomplish is a recognition of the 
,.., 
'--·,s e(3 :):) • 
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youngster's incapabilities of self discipline. Then as.a 
~esult, it must be realized that the child is to be 
disciplined by others. If, on the other hand, an educator 
1/ ,. 
chooses to let the child develop inaturally, 1 the child will 
~ltimately become unethical.3 When this outer authority is 
replaced by self-discipline, then the process of self-
entanglement bas begun. 
Let us look at the recommended curriculum of both 
Harris and Hegel. First, both men think that. foreign 
languages serve the function of assisting the individual to 
become self-entangled; foreign languages bring the individual 
to an unfamiliar atmosphere where he has to imagine life in 
early times.4 Harris claims that even a 'smattering' of 
II ~atin would help the individual understand Hthe legal and 
Poliltical views of human life. 115 
II 
I Also, physical training is utilized to help the 
•: 
~ndividual discipline himself. Hegel used military drill 
~o make the youngster 11carry out exactly what is commanded, 
il 6 
fithout debate with one•s self.JJ Here, physical training 
~s secondary to disciplining the individual to obey. 
~ One is led to conclude that the principle of 
entanglement or self-estrangement was reified. That 
II 
3see p. ·zs. 
4see pp 25 and 51. 
5rbid. 
6Harris, N.E.A. Proceedings, 1903, 360. 
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.this principle objectified, as a ·substantial reality, what 
is actually a fruitful idea which.would help to understand 
personality. 
There are exceptions to Harris' and Hegel's 
assumption that human personality is of such a nature that 
the individual first requires external discipline. That is 
to say they seemed to formalize their program to such an 
extent that differences among childrenwere not recognized. 
1However, this does not imply that generalizing is not valid. 
II 
But, one must recognize that there are exceptions to the 
Feneralization and one must make the necessary changes in 
~he school. 
In conclusion, it is apparent both Harris and Hegel 
1felt that the school had the responsibility in molding an 
social product, though it cannot be reduced to merely a 
social product. 
59 
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Eowever, in theory at least they felt that change 
t-n individuals would involve chantes in institutions, which 
~re manifestat.ions of individ-qal::>~ In the0ry then, clpange 
nvolves a reciprocal relation bet~een individuals and in-
:rtitu:t;.ions; but in practice~ the institutions become a static 
~ntity, a condition inconsistent with their concept.ion of 
~hange. 
I 
I 
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59 a 
.Primary Sources 
I 
~arri~, w. T. -- AEE 
. "The Aesthetic Element in Education" 
Paper read before the National Council of 
Education, at Milwaukee, 1897. 
h -- BEVSLPSS ds-Eye-View of the St. Lo.u is Public School System 11 Bureau of Education, Report of Commissioner, 
. 1898-99. 
-- BTHHM 
l!fiooks that Have Helped Me 11 
Forum, Vol. III, April~ 
-- cs 
--""'Jic"""h=-u-rch and Staten 
Western, March, 1874. 
--esc 
11- --nnT=-h.-e- Church, The State, and The School" 
' North American Review, No., CCXVII, 1881. 
-- CES 
r--..,.,n=c-o'"'""-Educa tion of Sexes 11 
N.E~A. Proceedings, 1898. 
-- CSPSU 
"A Course of Study from Primary School to University 
Western, No. 2, Sept., 1876. 
-- EFES 
--..,.,JIT~h-e Educa ti·on of the Family and the Education of the 
SchoolJJ 
Journal of Social Science, Vol. XV, 1882. 
-- EPNP 
i 11An Educational Policy for our New Possessions 
N.E.A. Proceedings, 1898. 
e 
li . . . ·~~ e Edu~~tion of the Negrou '· 
Atlantic Monthly, Vol. LXIX, June 1892. 
'I -- EUS 
1 "Education in the United StatesH 
. · Appeared in Elementary Education, N. M. Butler, (ed.) 
Albany, 1904. 
-- FHG 
l--..... n=Fa-i-:-th, Hope, and Chari tyll 
Journal of Social Science, No. XVIII, 1884. 
,. -- GRAE ~~--=-a-e-rma-n Reform in American Education 
St. LOuis, Hobart & Co., 1872. 
II 
-- HL l:t---=-~ Hegel's Logic 
: ~ 
'I I, 
Chicago, Griggs & Go., 1895. 
-- HPIO 
''History of Philosophy in Outline 11 
Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. X, No. 3, 
July 1876. 
,., 
-- HM 
.;..;...._.,.nH=-or-ace Mann tJ 
I" 
II 
Address delivered to N.E.A. at Buffalo, N.Y., 
July, 1896. 
-- HIWE 
"How I Was Educated}{ 
Forum, Vol. I, Aug., 1886. 
I -- IS 11!----.,.,JT=h~e- Isolation of the Schoolll 
Independent, Vol. LVII, No. 2748, Aug., 1901. 
-- KPHC 
"The Kindergarten and the Preparation for the Highest 
GivilizationJt 
Atlantic Educational Journal, Vol. 2, 1896. 
-- MEGS 
nMoral Education in Cormnon SchoolsH 
Journal of Social Science, Vol. XVII, 1884. 
-- PSR • 
Pendui)lum of ·school Reform" 
· Education~ Vol. VIII, Feb., 1888. 
~~--PO 
I 
Philosophy in Outline 
New YorkJ D. Appleton and Co .. , 1883. 
I -- PMS ~~~~---....n.,;,.phi...-r.losophy Made Simple" 
The Chautauqan~ Vol. VI~ May, 1886. 
II -- PCP 
.____""'H"=phio:-:-:losophy of Crime and PunishmentJJ 
:
11:. Read before National Prison Association, 1890. 
-- PSEUS 
---.... )1=-Pr-e-sent Status of Education in the United States" 
N.E.A. Proceedings, 1891. 
-- PFE 
Psycholo~ic Foundations of Education 
New York~ D. Appleton and co., Te98. 
-- PI 
;~"""; ----n-JJ-=p-sy-chological Inquiry" 
Education, Vol. VI, 1885. 
-- RWTP 
nThe Relation of Women to the Trades and Professions 11 
Educational Review~ Oct.~ 1900. 
-- RSDME ..---"!!'r~tT=-h:-e- Relation of School Discipline to Moral Education 11 
Third Year Book~ National Herbartian Society~ 1897. 
-- PNMTPS 
nThe Present Need of Moral Training in the Public Schools1 
Journal of Education, Vol. XXVI .. 
-- RIPS , 
nReligious Instruction in the Public Schools 11 
Independent, Vol. LX, Aug., 1903. 
-- RPOL 
l--=T.,...h-e-..Right of Property and OWnership of Land 
Boston, uupples ~ Hurd~ ana uo .. , le5C57. 
62 
II 
-- sc jr----nnT:o;o:'h\'"""e~ School Ci tyu ' 
School Bulletin, Vol. XXXII, March, 1906. 
1 -- SR ~~--~T~h~e~School Reader 
New York, D. Appleton, 1880. 
i -- SJW 
nsketch on the Justification of WarH 
Westerner, No. 788, 1873. 
-- SCFER t--"""'JI:"S~oc~ial Culture in the Form of Education and Religion11 
Education Review, Vol. XXIX., Jan., 1905 .. 
-- STEUS 
A Statement of the Theory of Education in the United 
States as Approved b~ Manz Leading Educators 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 187~. 
-- SRE 
11The Sphinx Riddles-of Educationn 
Westerner, No.3, Nov., 1877. 
II -- SSDDC 1~"---=Trh-e~Spiritual Sense of Dante•s Divina Commedia 
New York, D. Appleton and Co., 1889. 
-- SADCPICM 
11The Study of Arrested Development in Children as 
Produced in Injudicious School Methods 11 
Education, Vol. XX, April, 1900. 
H -- STOLH ; ~~--~S~yl~labus of Topics for Oral Lessons in History 
St. Lou:Ls., G. I. Jones ana Co., ltstsO. 
-- TAE 
Theory of American Education 
St. Louis, Western PUblishing and School Furnishing 
Co q 1870. 
-- UHE 
Ji..o--.... "'T=h:-e- Uses. of Higher Education 11 
Address at ::J?oston University, First Centennial, 1898. 
--
l 
I . -- wsws 
I
ll what Shall we Stu~ 
Western Pil'b:ffSh ng and School Furnishing Co., 1870. 
li 
· -- WMSSL 
r--...,nr.-;w,....h-y Women Should Study Law" 
Ohio Educational Monthly, Vol. L, July, 1901. 
Hegel, G. W. F. -- RPR 
Philosophy of Right (tr. S. w. Dyde) 
!1 London, George. B~ll and Sons, 1896. 
I -- PM 
11
,_1--=T,....h-e-·Phenomenology of Mind ( tr. J. B. Baillie) 
1
j New York, The· Macmillan Co., 1955. 
I~ -- EP /1:----,=--Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
New York, Philosophical Library, 1959 • 
Loewenburg, Jacob (ed.) -- HS 
Hegel Selections 
New York, Charles Scribner and Sons, 1929. 
II 
~~econdary Sources . 
I 
'Anderson Paul, Fisch Max -- PA 
Philosophy in America 
II New York, Appleton Century Crofts, Inc., 1939. 
1Blau, Joseph -- MMAP . 
ii Men and Movements in American Philosory 
· New York, Prentice Hall, Inc., 19 2. 
II ~oas, George -- DTMP 
1 Dominant Themes of Modern Philosoph~ 
New York, Roland Press Co., 195 . 
Cohen, MOrris -- AT 
American Thought 
Glencoe, Free Press, 1954. 
Cornu, Auguste -- OMT 
The Oriiins of Marxian Thought · 
Spr ngfield, Charles C. Thomas, 1957. 
64 
I 
'"\__) 
; 
Curti, Merle -- SIAE • 1 The Social Ideas of American Educators 
Peterson, Littlefield Adams & Co., 1959. 
Cubberly Ellwood -- HOE 
The History of Education 
New York, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1948. 
Eby, Frederich -- DME 
The Development of MOdern Education 
Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, Inc., 1955. 
Hoffding, Herald -- HMP 
The History of Modern Philosophy 
New York, Dover Publications, Inc., 1955. 
Leidecker, Kurt -- YT 
Yankee Teacher 
New York, Philosophical Library Inc., 1946. 
Luqueer, F. L. -- HAE 
Hegel As Educator 
New York, The Macmillan Co., 1896. 
,MacKenzie, M. H. -- HE 
r · Hegel •s Educational Theory and Practice 
London, swan Sonnenschein co., 1909 .. 
tMarcuse, Herbert -- RR 
l1 Reason and Revolution 
New York, Tqe Humanities Press, 1954. 
Muelder, W. Go & Sears,\Laurence -- DAP 
The Development of Amer·ican Philosophy 
Chicago, Open Court PUblishing Co., 1932. 
Muirhead, J. H. -- HHCA 
ii u How Hegel -Came to America n 
Philosophical Review, 1928~ 
Roberts, John -- WTH 
William Torrey Harris 
Washington, National Educational Association, 1924. 
Schaub, Edward (ed.) -- WTH 
William Torrey Harris 
Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1936. 
• 
Sj'bree, -- HPH 
Hegel 1s Philosophy of Histort 
· . New York, Dover Publlcat ons Inc., 1959. 
Stace, W. T. -- HP 
J
: The Philoso~hy of Hegel · 
New Yor , Dover Publications Inc., 1955. 
W lls Donald -- IHMGPS 
I I , 
I 
II 
II 
I 
I 
1.' 
i : 
The Influence of Hegel on Marx and T. H. Green in the 
Philosothy of the State 
Bos on University, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1946. 
66 
• 
